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It is interesting to note the historical evolution of the Wyoming
mortgage foreclosure practice involving personal judgments and the
right to jury trial and how it differs from the practices developed in
other states. The following article, tracing this evolution, is based on
a section from Professor Rudolph's new book, THE WYOMING LAW
OF REAL MORTGAGES.

WYOMING FORECLOSURE DECREES-PERSONAL JUDGMENTS AND
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
E. George Rudolph*

V

IEWED historically the primary function of foreclosure is

to terminate the mortgagor's interest in the mortgaged
land. This was entirely clear under the early practice when
strict foreclosure was the prevailing remedy and the decree
operated simply to make the mortgagee's title absolute upon
the expiration of a specified period for redemption. But with
the general change over to foreclosure by sale, and the development of the lien theory, we have come to place principal
emphasis upon the security aspect of the mortgage, and to
view foreclosure more as a means for applying the property
to the satisfaction of the debt. This, in turn, has resulted in
a tendency to equate foreclosure with the sale of land on
execution. As an original proposition this would seem to
make good sense, but historically the two are entirely different
and, consequently, any attempt to provide for both by a common set of rules is likely to result in a good deal of confusion
or worse. Wyoming has probably gone a good deal further
in this direction than most jurisdictions. The developments
now to be recounted have undoubtedly played a leading role
in this.
* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.

A.B., J.D.,

University of Michigan.
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The usual foreclosure decree in Wyoming first gives
judgment for the entire amount of the debt and then orders
the property sold "as upon execution" or "in conformity with
the statutes."' On the other hand, the conventional type decree
employed in many other jurisdictions finds the amount due,
orders the property sold and leaves the matter of a possible
deficiency judgment for later determination, jurisdiction for
such purpose being expressly reserved.' Properly speaking,
then, there is no such thing as a deficiency judgment in Wyoming.' It should be emphasized that Wyoming is certainly
not unique in this. Foreclosure in a substantial number of
states, especially in this area, follows a similar pattern.
The practice apparently came to us from Ohio, along with
the Code of Civil Procedure, and traces back to the case of
Ladd v. James,4 decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
1859. There the court held:
Where an action is brought upon a note and on a
mortgage given to secure its payment, and a judgment is asked upon the note, and for the sale of the
mortgaged property, any issue of fact which affects
the judgment upon the note, is an issue which either
party has a right to demand that it shall be tried by

a jury.
This obviously has reference to a suit to recover judgment for
the entire amount of the debt rather than a true deficiency
judgment. The court went on to say that if the plaintiff
merely sought a determination of the amount due and a sale
of the property there would be no right to a jury trial. It
further stated that the claim for personal judgment on the
note and the claim for mortgage foreclosure were separate
1.

See Walter v. Kressman, 25 Wyo. 292, 169 P. 3 (1917) and Grieve v. Huber,
41 Wyo. 168, 283 P. 1105 (1929). This statement is also based on a review
of foreclosure decrees in the office of the Clerk of the District Court for
Albany County. The quoted phrases are undoubtedly the result of WYO.
STAT. §§ 1-478 to 1-489 (1957) providing a common method for the sale and
redemption of realty for both execution and foreclosures.
2. See Form 14:504 in Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms 285 (1958).
8. In Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 52 Wyo. 1, 69 P.2d 525 (1937) the court
in discussing the conformation proceedings stated: "No deficiency judgment
was asked by plaintiff at this time or given by the court against the
defendants or either of them, nor could it have been had, as the sale was,
it will be noticed, apparently for the full amount of plaintiff's claim and
costs."
While this seems to assume the propriety of a deficiency judgment the
statement was wholly dictum and may not have received much consideration.
See also Conradt v. Lepper, 13 Wyo. 473, 81 P. 307 (1905) in which the
plaintiff apparently prayed for a conventional deficiency judgment.
4. 10 Ohio St. 438 (1859).
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causes of action, and that there might be a misjoinder if the
issue were seasonably raised.
In 1864, to take care of the question of possible misjoinder, the Ohio legislature enacted a statute expressly
authorizing the joining of claims for personal judgment on a
note with a claim for foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien
securing the note With this enactment the Ohio law took
its final form although it has been necessary for the Ohio
courts to reaffirm it from time to time since.6
The most important of the subsequent Ohio cases is
Simon v. Union Trust Company' which demonstrates that the
differences between the two types of foreclosure decrees may
be of practical importance apart from the jury trial question.
The mortgagor in that case had conveyed the premises subject
to the mortgage, and he therefore argued, in the foreclosure
suit, that no personal judgment should be entered against him
until after the sale and then only for the deficiency, if any.
The argument was based on the generally recognized substantive right of the mortgagor to be exonerated by the mortgaged
land under such circumstances. However, the court held
against the mortgagor on the ground that the practice of taking judgment for the full amount of the debt was too well
established to permit any exception. By way of contrast, it
may be noted that a foreclosing mortgagee in Arkansas apparently has a choice between the two types of decree.'
The Wyoming Code provision, patterned after the Ohio
enactment of 1864, read as follows:
In an action to foreclose a mortgage given to secure
the payment of money, or to enforce a specific lien
for the money, the plaintiff may also ask in his petition a judgment for the money claimed to be due;
5. See Simon v. Union Trust Co., 126 Ohio St. 346, 185 N.E. 425 (1933). For
the present version see OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.191 (Baldwin 1964).
6. King v. Safford, 19 Ohio St. 587 (1869) ; Maholm v. Marshall, 29 Ohio St.
611 (1876) ; Keller v. Wenzell, 23 Ohio St. 579 (1873) ; Crellin v. Armstrong,
32 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio App. 1936).
7. 126 Ohio St. 346, 185 N.E. 425 (1933). This expressly overruled Marion
Dev. Co. v. Bruce, 39 Ohio App. 253, 177 N.E. 471 (1931) which held under
similar circumstances that a personal judgment could be entered against
the mortgagor only after the sale and only for the deficiency.
8. Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 177 Ark. 1013, 8 S.W.2d 505
(1928); Bank of Endora v. Ross, 168 Ark. 754, 271 S.W. 703 (1925). These
Arkansas cases are interesting since they refer to the true deficiency judgment as the "ancient practice" and indicate that the practice of taking
judgment for the full amount of the debt is available only by virtue of
express statutory authorization.
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and such proceedings shall be had and judgment
rendered thereon as in a civil action for the recovery
of money only.'
The Wyoming Supreme Court considered the matter in
two cases decided prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but only with respect to the right to trial by
jury. In brief, these cases followed the Ohio law in holding
that if a personal judgment is sought either party may demand
a jury trial, but that, if the only relief requested is foreclosure
and sale, then the suit is equitable and there is no right to a
jury trial."° In neither case did the court mention the joinder
provision set out above, but instead confined its consideration
to the Code provision granting jury trials "in actions for the
recovery of money only.""
On the jury trial question another possibility deserves
mention. The law and practice in Oklahoma and Kansas are
generally considered similar to that of Ohio and Wyoming
on these matters. However, there is at least a suggestion in
some of the opinions from these jurisdictions that, if the
validity or amount of the debt is put in issue, then a jury
trial may be demanded even though foreclosure and sale is
the only relief sought.12 In one of its decisions, the Wyoming
court, by way of dictum, recognized the possibility of so holding." However, it seems clearly wrong. Consistently with the
statute last mentioned, the right to a jury trial should depend
upon the relief sought and not the issues litigated. It should
be added that the Oklahoma court seems to have finally
reached this result but only after a considerable cost in
litigation. 4
9. WYo. COMP. STAT. § 3-703 (1945).
10. Burns v. Corn Exchange Natl Bank, 33 Wyo. 474, 240 P. 683 (1925).
This holds that in a suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage in which no
personal judgment is sought the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial.
The reasoning is, of course, equally applicable to real mortgages. See also
Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27 (1916) containing dictum to
the effect that a jury trial may be demanded if a personal judgment is
sought. In a much earlier decision the court held that a jury was permissible even though foreclosure is equitable in nature, at least if the
verdict is only advisory. See Chosen Friends Home Loan & Say. League v.
Otterson, 7 Wyo. 89, 50 P. 194 (1897).
11. WYo. COMP. STAT. § 3-2104 (1945).
12. Jones v. Benson, 158 Okla. 25, 12 P.2d 202 (1932) ; Union Bank v. Chapman,
124 Kan. 315, 259 P. 681 (1927); Fidelity Natl Bank and Trust Co. v.
Cloninger, 142 Kan. 558, 51 P.2d 35 (1935).
13. Burns v. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank, 33 Wyo. 474, 240 P. 683 (1925).
14. Irwin v. Sanks, 265 P.2d 1097 (Okla. 1953).
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The Wyoming court recently considered a somewhat different aspect of the matter in Chopping v. First National
Bank of Lander." In that case the mortgagee did seek a
personal judgment, but the court nonetheless held that the
mortgagor was not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of
right. After the maturity of the debt the mortgagor had
given the mortgagee a further mortgage on an additional
tract of land. The mortgagor alleged that at the time of this
transaction the mortgagee had orally agreed to accept a
conveyance of such land in satisfaction of the debt, and that
he had signed the mortgage thinking that it was a deed. The
court construed this as a counterclaim for reformation and
for specific performance of the oral agreement. Both types
of relief are equitable in nature, and the court therefore
concluded that the case presented no issue properly triable
on the law side of the court and that the defendant was not
entitled to a jury trial." The end result, then, seems to be that
there is no right to jury trial unless a personal judgment is
sought, and then only if legal, as opposed to equitable, defenses are asserted.
In the Chopping case the court noted that the law on the
question, as stated in the earlier Wyoming cases, may have
been changed by the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but the court found it unnecessary to consider this. At least
on the surface the possible changes appear substantial.
In brief, the Rules preserve the statute with respect to
jury trials as Rule 38 (a) and, by Rule 87, supersede or abrogate the joinder provision. Rule 18, on joinder of claims and
remedies generally, is intended to stand in its place. So far
as pertinent to the present discussion, Rule 18 reads as
follows:
(a) Joinder of Claims. The plaintiff in his complaint .. may join either as independent or as alternate
claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both
as he may have against an opposing party ....
15. 419 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1966).
16. This mode of analysis is correct since the Wyoming Supreme Court held
in Bank of Rock Springs v. Foster, 9 Wyo. 157, 61 P. 466, 63 P. 1056
(1900), that Wyoming Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 preserves the
common law right to trial by jury in civil cases. A mere reading of the
constitutional provision might indicate otherwise.
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(b) Joinder of Remedies. ... Whenever a claim is
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has
been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be
joined in a single action; but the court shall grant relief
in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties ....
The simplest solution to the problem presented by the
elimination of the joinder statute is to continue the old practice under paragraph (a) of Rule 18. Apart from being
general instead of specific the only apparent change made
by the rule is the elimination of the statutory clause: "...;
and such proceeding shall be had and judgment rendered
thereon as in a civil action for the recovery of money only."
The obvious purpose of this was to take care of the jury trial
question. But, as the Ohio history shows, it was not really
necessary for such purpose. Likewise, as previously noted,
the Wyoming Supreme Court, in considering the right to
jury trial in a mortgage foreclosure suit, did not find it
necessary to refer to the joinder statute.
The only trouble with the above analysis is that it does
not square with the intention of the draftsmen of the federal
rule on joinder of which Wyoming Rule 18 is a literal copy.
In their view, the mortgagee's right to a personal judgment
in a foreclosure is taken care of by paragraph (b) of Rule 18,
not paragraph (a). The Advisory Committee Note to Federal
Rule 18, Subdivision (b), states:
This rule is inserted to make it clear that in a single
action a party shall be accorded all the relief to which
he is entitled regardless of whether it is legal or
equitable or both. This necessarily includes a deficiency judgment in foreclosure actions formerly provided for in Equity Rule 10."7
Even without going into the old equity rule it is obvious
that the reference here is to the more conventional type foreclosure decree which first directs the sale of the mortgaged
property and the application of the proceeds and then proFEDERAL PRACTICE § 18.01 (2d ed. 1968). Professor Moore criticizes this on the grounds that in a foreclosure suit there is only one claim
or cause of action and therefore no joinder issue at all, but only a question
of obtaining both legal and equitable relief in a single action and that the
latter is authorized by Rule 2. 8 MOORE'S § 18.09. However, this analysis
seems unsatisfactory on the jury trial issue.

17. 3 MOORE-'s
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vides for a personal judgment against the mortgagee for the
deficiency only.
It would seem, therefore, that the adoption of the Rules
could properly be viewed as directing a fundamental change
in Wyoming foreclosure practice. Certainly the only basis
for importing the Ohio practice was the joinder statute now
abrogated. Since, apart from the jury trial question, the
problem is wholly procedural, such a reading of the Rules
would not seem to raise any question concerning the scope
of the Court's rule-making authority.' 8 While such a change
would no doubt eliminate the right to jury trial in foreclosure
suits, this would come about more or less incidentally or
indirectly. A foreclosure suit which results in a true deficiency judgment could not very well be considered an action
"for the recovery of money only" within the meaning of
Rule 38 and the prior statute. It is principally an action for
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property, and the
deficiency judgment is only incidental or ancillary thereto. "
The Wyoming cases, previously considered, which confirm
the mortgagor's right to a jury trial when a personal judgment is sought, dealt with an entirely different type of
judgment and therefore would not be in point.
A further problem which would have to be faced in following this course should be mentioned. There is substantial
authority that a deficiency judgment may be entered only if
authorized by statute or, possibly, a rule of court.2" No attempt
will be made to discuss the problem in detail here. The proposition traces back to the New York case of Dunkley v. Van
Buren,2 1 decided in 1818, which held that a deficiency judgment could not be entered in a foreclosure suit. The decision
was based on the impropriety of joining claims for legal and
equitable relief. This objection is, of course, no longer available in view of the one form of action provisions of both the
18.

See WYO. STAT. § 5-19 (1957).

19. See Young v. Vail, 29 N.M. 324, 222 P. 912 (1924) holding that there is no
right to a jury trial where a true deficiency judgment is sought since such a
judgment may be considered as a further equitable remedy granted in the
foreclosure suit, which is clearly equitable, to provide complete relief.
Although the rationales may vary no state recognizes a right to jury trial
with respect to such a deficiency judgment. See OSBORNE ON MORTGAGES
977 (1951).
20.

See OSBORNE ON MORTGAGES 976 (1951)

21.

(1943).
3 Johns, Ch. 330 (1818).

and 1 GLENN ON MORTGAGES 466
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Code and the Rules.22 In addition, it may properly be argued
that Rule 18(b) itself provides sufficient authority for a
deficiency judgment. This, clearly, is the federal position on
the question. 3
Obviously no very definite conclusion is now possible on
this question. There is probably nothing really wrong with
the old practice, in the sense of reversible error, even under
the Rules. The real question is whether a mortgagee may, if
he desires, have the other type decree with a true deficiency
judgment. The answer to this question probably awaits a
mortgagee who feels strongly enough about the jury trial
issue to take a case to the Supreme Court. In the meantime,
it is interesting to note that the person most responsible for
the present foreclosure practice in Ohio and Wyoming, and
apparently a number of other states, is the lawyer, long dead
and no doubt largely forgotten, who drafted the complaint
and judgment in Ladd v. James. Had he chosen to cast these
papers in the other form, providing first for the foreclosure
sale and then for a true deficiency judgment, the questions
presented for consideration by the court would have been
entirely different. And, it may be supposed, the legislative
response, if any were needed, would likewise have been different. In other words, the matter would have developed as
it did in other jurisdictions which started from Dunkley v.
Van Buren.

22. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 2.
23. See 1 GLENN ON MORTGAGES 463 (1924).
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